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THE MALLEABLE USE OF HISTORY IN
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS JURISPRU-
DENCE: HOW THE "DEEPLY ROOTED"
TEST SHOULD NOT BE A BARRIER TO
FINDING THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT'S DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Abstract: Passed in 1996, the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA")
clarifies "marriage" as referring exclusively to a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife. Paralleling the intense social
debate over same-sex marriages, DOMA sparked an array of scholarly at-
tacks on its own constitutionality. The author argues that scholarship
should not overlook substantive due process jurisprudence in challeng-
ing DOMA. The U.S. Supreme Court's use of history in defining fun-
damental rights under substantive clue process is sufficiently flexible to
accommodate same-sex marriages within the fundamental right to mar-
riage. The Court, although emphasizing tradition and history as the
roots from which fundamental rights stem, has been willing to overlook,
or to selectively read, such history and traditions. The author concludes
that a failure to extend fundamental right status to same-sex marriage
would in fact undermine some of the Court's most notable precedents
in this area of law.
INTRODUCTION
On September 21, 1996, President. Clinton signed into law the
Defense of Marriage Act. ("DOMA"). 1 Congress enacted DOMA to
protect society from the perceived menace that same-sex marriages
pose to heterosexuality, morality, and procreation.2
Congress enacted DOMA in 1996 largely as an attempt to cir-
cumvent the impact of the rulings in Baehr v. Lewin and in Romer v.
Evans. 3 In 1993, in &MP; the Hawaii Supreme Court held that denial
1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996).
2 Charles J. Butler, The Defense of Marriage Act: Congms's Use of Narrative in the Debate Over
Same-Sex Marriage, 73 N.Y.U. L. REY. 841, 844 (1998).
3 See Ranier Y. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Baehr s'. Lewin, 852 13.2c1 44 (flaw. 1993);
Jon-Peter Kelly, Act of Infidelity: Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Unfaithfill to the Constitntion,
7 Comm. J.L. & Putt. Poi:v 203, 204 (1997).
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of marriage to same-sex couples constitutes gender discrimination,
and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitu-
tion's Equal Protection Clause.`? In 1996, in Romet; the U.S. Supreme
Court struck down Colorado's Constitutional Amendment 2, which
prohibited government action or policies that protected gay men and
lesbians from discrimination. 5 The Romer Court held that gay men
and lesbians6 are not a suspect classification for the purposes of fed-
eral equal protection analysis, and thereby applied only minimum
rationality scrutiny.? The Court reasoned, however, that under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, prejudice toward a
group that amounts to an animus is an impermissible justification for
denying such a group equal protection of the laws. 8
In response to judicial acknowledgement of the civil rights of
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered ("LGBT") people,. Con-
gress passed DOMA.9 DOMA permits individual states to refuse rec-
ognition of any same sex marriage, even one recognized by another
state)° More importantly for due process purposes, DOMA defines
the words "marriage" and "spouse" for the purposes of federal stat-
utes and regulations as referring exclusively to a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife. 11
Given the intense debate over the constitutionality of same-sex
marriages, DOMA sparked all array of scholarly attacks on its own
constitutionality. 12 Most of the literature thus far has focused on
whether Congress had the power to enact. DOMA tinder the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.ls Some limited commentary has analyzed DOMA's
constitutionality under the Establishment Clause and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause."
4 852 P.2d at 67.
5
 517 U.S. at 635-36.
6 Note that the Romer Court referred to this class as "homosexuals" in its opinion.
7
 517 U.S. at 634-35.
8 Id. at 634.
9 See Kelly, supra note 3, at 204.
19 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (including public acts, records, or judicial proceedings).
" Id.
12 See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster: On DOMA, Covenant Mar-
?Urges, and Full Faith and Credit Jurisprudence, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 307 (1998); Sherri L. Tous-
saint, Defense of Marriage Act: Isn't It Ironic ... Don't You ThinIOA Little Too Ironic?, 76 NEB. L.
REV. 924 (1997) (citing extensive scholarly commentary, including Laurence Tribe's testi-
mony to Congress, on the unconstitutionality of DOMA).
13 See, e.g., Strasser, supra note 12.
14 See, e.g., James M. Donovan, DOMA: An Unconstitutional Establishment of Fundamentalist
Christianity, 4 Micn. J. GENDER & LAW 335 (1997); Toussaint, supra note 12 (analyzing
DOMA under substantive due process and equal protection).
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Few scholars, however, have analyzed DOMA's constitutionality
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 15 Those who
have, either tentatively endorsed its usefulness in challenging
DOMA's constitutionality, or concluded that other avenues, such as
the Equal Protection Clause, are preferable to the due process
route. I°
This Note argues that the U.S. Supreme Court's use of history in
defining fundamental rights under substantive due process is
sufficiently flexible to accommodate same-sex marriages within the
fundamental right to tnarriage. 17
 Such a finding would consequently
subject. DOMA to strict scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. 18
 Additionally, this Note argues that a contrary
finding might undermine the substantive due process protection ac-
corded to other areas of choice about one's intimate associations,
particularly abortion and contraception. 0
 Indeed, the Court's refusal
to apply similar historical methodologies to same-sex marriages could
call into question the continued viability of those methodologies. 20
IS See Kelly, supra note 3, at 220-26; Toussaint, supra note 12, at 959-61; Germaine
Winnick Willem Note, Equality Under the Law or Annihilation of Marriage and Morals? The
Same-sex Marriage Debate, 73 Ir). L.J. 355, 362-65 (1997). Note that other scholars have
commented on the application of substantive clue process to same-sex marriages, but not
with a specific focus on DONIA's constitutionality. See, e.g., Anne B. Brown, Note: The Evolv-
ing Definition of Marriage, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 917, 924-28 (1998).
16 See Kelly, supra note 3. at 220-21, 230-31 (distinguishing Bowers v. Hardwick on the
ground that it was not about marriages, and arguing that the right to same-sex marriages
can be found to be deeply rooted in history if a broader view of history, which includes
historic inconsistencies and multi-cultural traditions, is adopted by the Court); Toussaint,
supra note 12, at 939-40, 952, 960 (analogizing same-sex marriages to interracial mar-
riages, and arguing that, since the Loving v. Virginia Court rejected the argument that in-
terracial marriages are not themselves rooted in history and traditions, the same argument
should not prevail for same-sex marriages; further framing the right in question as free-
dom of personal choice and concluding that, because lower courts have used the ''deeply
rooted" test to deny fundamental right status to same-sex marriages, the Equal Protection
Clause would be a preferable route to challenge DOMA); see also Willett, supra note 15, at
363 (pointing out that the Court upheld abortion, contraception, and interracial mar-
riages as fundamental rights despite the fact that states traditionally proscribed them).
Although Willett points out the Court's flexible use of history in substantive due process
cases, she never explicitly argues, as this Note does, that the "deeply rooted" test need not
be a barrier to according fundamental right status to same-sex marriages, even if the right
is narrowly defined. See. Willett, supra note 15, at 363-65.
17 See infra notes 196-250 and accompanying text.
w See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1978).
19 See infra notes 251-255 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 251-261. Note that commentators have not yet argued, as this Note
does, that a refusal to extend fundamental right status to same-sex marriages in a constitu-
tional challenge to DONIA would impair the viability of substantive due process prece-
dents.
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Part 1.A of this Note will briefly summarize the concept of sub-
stantive due process. 2i Part LB will then discuss how the Court has
applied the "deeply rooted" test for a constitudonally fundamental
right in its substantive due process jurisprudence. 22 It will highlight
cases where the rights in question were not deeply rooted in our his-
tory, tradition and collective conscience, but were nevertheless ac-
corded fundamental right status. 23 For instance, in 1967, in Loving v.
Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court held that interracial marriages are
encompassed under the fundamental right to marriage, despite the
fact that interracial marriages were themselves not deeply rooted in
our history and traditions. 24
Part LB will also examine broad concepts used by the Court that
suggest the "deeply rooted" test is not an exact proxy for the Court's
substantive due process jurisprudence. 26 This section will also touch
upon some of the scholarship that analyzes DOMA from a substantive
due process prospective. 26 Part LC will explore the Framers' intent
with regard to the meaning of liberty. 27 Part I.D will explore whether
same-sex marriages could be construed as deeply rooted in our tradi-
tions, history, and collective conscience. 28
Part II will argue that the Court's substantive due process juris-
prudence can comfortably accommodate same-sex marriages within
the fundamental right to marriage. 29 It will accomplish this by first
analyzing, in Part ILA, cases that suggest the Court is using its sub-
stantive due process jurisprudence to protect a broader, underlying
fundamental right to an individual's self-definitional autonomy—a
broad right which includes the narrower right to same-sex mar-
riages." Part II.B will then draw on cases where the "deeply rooted"
test was not strictly followed to argue, in the alternative, that the test
need not be a barrier to according same-sex marriages fitndamental
right status even if such marriages are narrowly defined and therefore
interpreted as not being deeply rooted in our history and traditions. 31
21 See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 42-137 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 79-125 and accompanying text.
24 See 388 U.S. 1,12 (1967).
25 Sec infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 106-107,112,134 and accompanying text.
27 Sec infra notes 138-148 and accompanying text.
28 Sec infra notes 149-177 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 196-250 and accompanying text.
58 See infra notes 196-237 and accompanying text.
31 Sec infra notes 238-250 and accompanying text. The word "interpreted" is used to
emphasize the malleability of history and to reflect the fact that the Court's majority and
dissent often reach widely divergent conclusions about the history of the same right. See
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The Conclusion will then argue that a failure to extend fundamental
right status to same-sex marriages—and the corresponding failure to
subject DOMA to strict scrutiny under substantive due process"—
would in fact undermine some of the Court's most notable
precedents in this area of law."
I. BACKGROUND
A. Substantive Due Process
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution was
adopted in 1791. 34 It prohibits the federal government from depriv-
ing any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law."
The Fifth Amendment has been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme
Court to embody a substantive, as well as a procedural, liberty interest
in due process. 3° Substantive clue process is not limited to the specific
guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights and its penumbras." The
liberty interests accorded strongest. protection under substantive due
process are those found to be fundamental."
In defining what constitutes a fundamental liberty interest, the
Court looks at whether the right in question is deeply rooted in our
history, traditions, and evolving collective conscience, such that it is
implicit in the Anglo-American concept of ordered liberty. 39 If the
right is found to be a fundamental liberty interest under this "deeply
rooted" test, statutes or other government actions that infringe upon
it are presumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny.° This sub-
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94, 199-204 (1986); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
158-66, 173-75 (1973).
3'2
 This Note will focus exclusively on the fact that same-sex marriages should be in-
cluded within the fundamental right to marriage protected by substantive due process,
which in turn would require that the court subject DOMA to strict scrutiny. It will not,
however, address the issue of whether the state interests in support of DOMA would be
compelling, or whether DOMA is narrowly tailored to achieving those interests, as these
arguments have been adequately addressed elsewhere. Sec Kelly, supra note 3, at 226-30;
Toussaint, supra note 12, at 969-72.
33 See infra notes 251-261 and accompanying text.
34 Sec U.S. CONST. ;MIMI d. V.
35 Id,
" Sec Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 492-93 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
This analysis also applies to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. Sec id. (Goldberg, J„ concurring).
37
 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977).
311 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1978).
39
 Mawr, 431 U.S. at 503-04; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
4° See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386-87.
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stantive clue process analysis applies interchangeably to both the
states, via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and to
the federal government, via the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.41
B. Substantive Due Process Caselaw
The Court looks to the history of the right in question when it
applies the "deeply rooted" test for fundamental rights under substan-
tive due process:12 Under this test, a right will be found to be funda-
mental if its social and legal history demonstrates that it is so en-
trenched in American culture as to be implicit in our concept of or-
dered liberty. 48 Whether the historical evidence supports a finding of
fundamental status in turn depends on how broadly or narrowly the
Court frames the right in question:"
1. Rights That Are Deeply Rooted on Their Face
In some cases, the fundamental right in question is clearly deeply
rooted in our history and traditions. 45 Among these are family and
marriage rights:18 For instance, in the 1977 decision Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, the U.S. Supreme Court struck an East. Cleveland ordi-
nance that limited the occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a
family, and imposed criminal penalties on those who violated the or-
dinance:17 This ordinance recognized only a few categories of related
individuals as a family:18 Plaintiff lived in East Cleveland with her son
41 See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 543-44 (Whited., dissenting).
42 See id. at 503-04; Griswold. 381 U.S. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
46 See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-04.
44 Sec Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,188,199 (1986) (majority holds that the nar-
row right to homosexual sodomy is not fundamental, while dissent finds the broader, fun-
damental right to "be let alone" is really the right at issue); Moore, 431 U.S. at 549-50
(White, j., dissenting) (acknowledging that the Court "estimates" what is deeply rooted in
our traditions, and that it is arguable what that the deeply rooted traditions of the country
are); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486,527 (majority finds the broad right to privacy in marriage is
fundamental, whereas dissent finds the narrow right to use contraceptives is not funda-
mental),
45 See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384. The word "clearly" is used in a relative sense; namely,
the rights in these cases are clearly rooted only in comparison to the rights in question in
other substantive clue process cases. Assessing the traditions of a nation is an inherently
subjective task that is less than clear in most cases. Sec Moore, 431 U.S. at 549-50 (White, j„
dissenting).
46 See, Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384; rl loore. 431 U.S. at 503.
47 See 431 U.S. at 498,506.
48 Id. at 496 n.2.
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and her two grandsons, who were first cousins rather than brothers. 49
She received a notice of violation from the city, stating that one of her
grandchildren was an illegal occupant, and directing her to comply
with the ordinance." When she failed to remove her grandson from
her home, the city filed criminal charges." The Court reasoned that
the Cleveland ordinance sliced deeply into the family itself, thus in-
fringing upon the freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life, Which are fundamental liberties protected by substan-
tive due process. 52
The Moore Court defined "family" broadly to encompass Mrs.
Moore's family arrangement and other extended families comprised
of relatives of the same degree of kinship." The Court cited historical
evidence that the institution of the family is deeply rooted in our na-
tion's traditions and history. The Court pointed out that a tradition
of uncles, aunts, cousins, and grandparents sharing a household
along with parents and children has deep roots in our history." Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall pointed out in their concurring opinion
that extended and non-nuclear families are particularly prevalent
among minority groups." They stressed that the Constitution cannot
be interpreted to enable the government to impose white suburbia's
cultural myopia upon the rest of the population. 57
In addition, the Moore Court stressed that certain rights associ-
ated with the family have been protected as fundamental rights be-
cause they bear upon an individual's freedom of choice in personal
matters relating to individual fulfillment. 58 The Court emphasized
that substantive due process represents a balance that the Court has
46 Id. at 496.
50 Id. at 497.
51 Id.
52
 Sec Moors, 431 U.S. at 498-99. But see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2, 8-
10 (1974) (upholding, under rational-basis scrutiny, an ordinance that imposed limits on
the types of groups that could occupy a single dwelling unit, but expressly allowed all who
were related by blood, adoption or marriage to live together). The Moore Court distin-
guished Belle Terre on the ground that the Belle Terre ordinance affected only unrelated
individuals, and that it promoted "family needs" and "family values," thereby not infring-
ing upon the fundamental right to personal choice in matters of marriage and family life.
Moore, 431 U.S. at 498-99.
55 Sec id. at 503-06,
64 Id. at 503-04.
55 Id. at 504.
56
 Id. at 510 (Brennan, J., concurring).
57 Moore, 431 U.S. at 507-08 (Bremnt, J., concurring).
58 Sec id. at 500-01, 504 n.11 (citing with approval a commentator's suggestion that
Griswold is best understood as a reaffirmation of the Court's continuing obligation to pro-
tect modes of individual fulfillment which are at the heart of a free society).
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struck between the liberty of the individual and the demands of or-
ganized society. 59 The liberty guaranteed by due process, the Court
reasoned, is neither limited to the specific guarantees of the Constitu-
tion, nor is it a series of isolated rights. 6° It concluded that protected
individual liberty is a rational continuum that includes freedom from
all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints by the
government. 61 The Court then hinted that the "deeply rooted" test. is
a guide rather than a bright-line rule in defining fundamental rights
under substantive clue process. 62
Similarly, in 1978, in Zablocki v. Redliait the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down a Wisconsin statute that required court approval before
any resident having child-support obligations could marry.° Plaintiff
was an indigent Wisconsin resident who could not afford to pay child
support to his illegitimate child, and therefore was denied permission
to marry another woman." The Court reasoned that the freedom to
marry is a fundamental liberty interest of all individuals protected by
the Due Process Clause. 65 Thus, restrictions on an individual's ability
to enter into a marriage are subject to strict scrutiny. 66 The Court also
suggested that direct legal obstacles in the path of persons desiring to
get married are subject to strict scrutiny.°
In his concurring opinion, however, Justice Powell cautioned that.
the Court has yet to hold that all regulations touching upon marriage
implicate a fundamental right.68 Justice Powell pointed to state regu-
lations banning homosexuality as an example of historical state re-
strictions on marriage, and implied that such restrictions should not
be subject to strict scrutiny. 69
59 Id. at 501.
w Id. at 502.
61 Id.
62 Sec Moore, 431 U.S. at 501, 503 (emphasizing that substantive due process represents
a balance that the Court has struck between the liberty of the individual and the demands
of organized society, and stating that the limits on substantive due process come not from
arbitrary lines but from a respect for history and the basic values that underlie our soci-
ety): see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (noting that Constitu-
tional interpretation involves reasoned judgment, and that due process has not been re-
duced to any simple formula).
63 See 434 U.S. 374, 386, 390-91 (1978).
64 Id. at 376-78.
65 Id. at 384.
66 Id. at 385-86.
67 See id. at 38711.12.
68 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
69 See id. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
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In 1987, in Turner v. Saficy, the U.S. Supreme Court struck a
prison regulation that restricted inmates' right to marry. 7° The Court
found that the regulation infringed on the inmates' residual liberty
interest in the fundamental right to marriage. 71 Even though the
Court recognized that marriage is a fundamental right, the Court ap-
plied a lower standard of scrutiny because the state had a valid pe-
nological interest in restricting the liberty of criminal inmates. 72 De-
spite this strong state interest, however, the Court reasoned that many
important attributes of marriage remained such that the regulation in
question must. be struck. 73
In Turner; the Court protected the inmates' right to marriage de-
spite the fact that it allowed the state to restrict the inmates' sexual
freedom. 74 The Court found that elements of marriage such as emo-
tional support, public commitment, spiritual significance and per-
sonal dedication remain intact even for criminals whose liberty inter-
ests are legitimately curtailed by the penal system. 75
The Court purported to be applying a lower standard of scrutiny
in Turner: 76 Rather than accepting the state's stated purpose in enact-
ing the regulation, however, the Court inquired into actual penologi-
cal interests and to ready alternatives that would fully accommodate
the prisoners' marriage interests at a de minimis cost to the valid pe-
nological interests." Turner demonstrates that the Court assumes that
the right to enter into a marriage is fundamental and deserves great
protection even in cases where the individual's liberty interests are
already compromised. 78
2. Rights That Are Not Deeply Rooted on Their Face: Linking the
Narrowly-Defined Right to a Broader Right's Deep Roots to Ac-
cord It Fundamental-Right Status
Unlike the above cases, however, some of the Court's precedents
extend fundamental status to rights that are not, on their face, deeply
rooted in our history and traditions. 79
 To accomplish this, the Court
7° 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987).
73
 See if. I. at 95.
72 Id. at 81, 95.
7 '4 See id. at 81, 95-96 (noting that the applicable standard of review is whether the
marriage regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective).
74 hi, at 95-96.
75 Turner; 482 U.S. at 95-96,
76 Sec id. at 89.
77 See id. at 89-91,
78 See id. at 116 (Stevens,,)., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79 Sec Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-86.
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analyzes the history of a broader, more generalized right. in applying
its "deeply rooted" test.8° The Court does this when the right at bar, if
narrowly defined, would not be deeply rooted in our history and tra-
ditions. 81 Thus, by grounding its analysis on the broader right's deep
roots, the Court holds as fundamental the narrower right that is actu-
ally at bar. 82
For instance, in the 1965 decision Griswold v. Connecticut, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the fundamental right to privacy surround-
ing the marriage relationship includes the right for married couples
to use contraceptives." In Griswold, a Connecticut statute imposed a
fine or imprisonment on any person who used contraceptive drugs or
devices to prevent conception . 84
The Griswold Court grounded its holding not on a narrow right
to use contraceptives, but on the broader right of privacy in one's as-
sociations, particularly marriage. 85 It reasoned that marriage should
be protected because it is an association that. promotes a way of life, a
harmony in living, and a bilateral loyalty. 88 Justice Goldberg noted in
concurrence that the right to privacy in marriage is fundamental and
deeply rooted in our society. 87 Justice White defined the right at issue
in Griswold as a fundamental right to be free of regulation of the inti-
macies of the marital relationship. 88 By couching the fundamental
right in question as that to privacy in marriage, the Court recognized
as fundamental the narrower, derivative right of married couples to
use contraception. 89 The Court did so despite the historical moral
disapproval of contraceptive use.9° Thus, to reach the result in Gris-
wokl, the plurality used the history of the right to privacy in marriage,
80 Sec Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-86.
Si See Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 (noting that numerous states traditionally and contempo-
raneously outlawed interracial marriages); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing).
82 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-86 (noting that if the Court does
not extend constitutional protection to the peripheral rights, the specific rights would be
less secure).
" See 381 U.S. at 485-86.
94 Id. at 480.
99 Sec id. at 483-86.
99 Id. at 486.
87
 Id. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
88 Griswold, 381 U .S. at 502-503 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
99 Id. at 486.
90 See id. at 505 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that Connecticut dis-
approved of the use of contraceptives for the purposes of preventing conception on moral
grounds, and had proscribed such use for over 80 years).
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and not the history of the narrower right to contraceptive use, as the
focus of its analysis under the "deeply rooted" test. 91
The Griswold Court reasoned that the right to privacy in marriage
is fundamental because it is necessary to an individual's pursuit of
happiness through her or his beliefs, thoughts, emotions and sensa-
tions. 92
 The Court implied that it is proper for substantive due proc-
ess to protect. rights that ensure conditions favorable to individuals'
pursuit. of happiness and to secure individuals' right to be let alone,
because the Framers intended the Constitution to provide such pro-
tections." The Court cautioned, however, that its holding in no way
undermined a state's proper regulation of what it termed "sexual
promiscuity," which included same-sex sexual conduct, and a state's
right to determine who may marry.94
Similarly, in Loving v. Virginia, a 1967 decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court struck down a Virginia anti-miscegenation statute, holding it
violated the due process liberty interest in the freedom to marry. 95
The Virginia statute in Loving imposed a felony conviction on white
persons who married a person of another race, and automatically
voided all marriages between a white person and what it. termed a
"colored person."98 The Lovings, a white man and a black woman,
were married in the District. of Columbia in June of 1958 and re-
turned to Virginia where they established their marital home. 97 They
were indicted for violating Virginia's ban on interracial marriages and
sentenced to one year in jail. 98
 The trial judge suspended the sen-
tence for 25 years on condition that the Lovings leave the state and
not return to Virginia together for 25 years."
The Court upheld the Lovings' right to marry despite the his-
torical and contemporaneous opposition to interracial marriages in
the U.S.") The Court struck the statute primarily on Equal Protection
grounds, because it constituted invidious racial discrimination on its
face.m The Court. also held, however, that Virginia's anti-
91 Sec id. at 486.
92 Sec id. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
99 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 494-95 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
94 Id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
95 See 388 U.S. at 12.
go Id. at 4.
97 Id. at 2.
98 Id. al 3.
" Id.
10
 Sec Loving, 388 U.S, at 6, 12 (mentioning that sixteen states prohibited and crimi-
nalized interracial marriages at the time of this decision, and noting that penalties for
miscegenation had been common since the colonial period).
101 Id. at 8.
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miscegenation statute violated the Due Process Clause. 1 °2 The Court
reasoned that the freedom to marry the person of one's choosing had
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free people." It further stated
that the freedom to marry or not to marry resides with the individual
and cannot be infringed upon by the state."
The Loving Court thus concluded that an individual's fundamen-
tal freedom of choice to marry includes the right to marry interra-
cially, despite the historical opposition to this particular, non-
traditional form of marriage." The Court accomplished this by fram-
ing the right as the broader right to marriage in lieu of focusing on
the narrower right to marry interracially." Therefore, the Loving
Court was able to use the deep historical roots of the broader right to
support the extension of fundamental right status to its narrower
variant. 107
3. Rights That Are Not Deeply Rooted on Their Face: Selectively Us-
ing the Right's Historic Roots to Accord It Fundamental-Right
Status
In other cases, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld rights that were
not deeply rooted in our history, without attempting to frame them
broadly.")8 In order to uphokl a right as fundamental in these cases,
the Court discounted the problematic historical evidence." It instead
102 Id. at 12.
10 Id.
104 Id.
1 °5 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 6, 12.
1 °6 See id. at 12. Some commentators who analyzed DOHA under substantive clue proc-
ess mentioned the Court's willingness to accord fundamental right status to interracial
marriages in Loving despite the fact that such marriages were not deeply rooted in our
history and traditions. See Toussaint, supra note 12, at 940. One commentator also noted
that the Loving Court accomplished this by framing the right in question as the right to
marry a person of one's choosing. See id. Commentators have stopped short of arguing,
however, as this Note does, that same-sex marriages can be accorded fundamental right
status under substantive due process even if they are narrowly defined as same-sex marriages.
(as opposed to Loving's broader framing of the right in question as the right to marry a
person of one's choosing) and found not to be deeply rooted in our history and traditions.
See id.
107 Sec Loving. 388 U.S. at 12; sec also Toussaint, supra note 12, at 940 (analogizing inter-
racial marriages in Loving to same-sex marriages and arguing that the analysis of DOMA's
constitutionality tinder substantive due process should likewise focus on the broader right
to marry and to choose one's spouse, and not on the narrower variant form of marriage
that does not have deep roots).
" Sec Casty, 505 U.S. at 846-50; Roe v, Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158-66 (1973).
109 Sec Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-50; Roe, 410 U.S. at 158-66.
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selectively focused on the parts of history that supported the infer-
ence that our evolving conscience is increasingly accepting the right.
in question as implicit in the concept of ordered liberty)" Namely,
the Court. focused on both the historical inconsistencies and on the
changes in the history of the right in question that showed a liberaliz-
ing trend toward acceptance of that right)" This use of history com-
ports with the view of some commentators, who have pointed out the
inconsistent and diverse nature of history and traditions, and the fact
that traditions are in a constant state of flux." 2
For instance, in 1973, in Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that. the constitutional guarantee of personal privacy includes a
woman's fundamental right to choose to have an abortion." 3 In Roe, a
young pregnant Texas woman challenged a Texas statute that crimi-
nalized abortion except in limited circumstances)" The Court rea-
soned that the woman's choice of whether to bear a child lies within
the zones of privacy that are deemed fundamental or implicit in the
concept. of ordered liberty. 1 l 5
 To support its point about the impact of
this deeply personal choice on a woman's liberty, the Court pointed
to the psychological harm, mental and physical stress, and continuing
stigma that may result from bearing an unwanted child."°
The Roe Court recognized a woman's liberty interest in an abor-
tion as protected under substantive clue process despite deeply en-
trenched societal and religious convictions against abortion."' The
"0 Sec Casty, 505 U.S. at 846-50; Roe, 410 U.S. at 158-66; see also Mom 431 U.S. at 501
(stating that the Court should look both to the traditions that Americans have stuck to and
to the traditions that we have broken in determining what is implicit in our concept of
ordered liberty); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring),
111 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-50 (stating that in applying the "deeply rooted" test, the
Court must look not only to the traditions that Americans have stuck to, but also to the
traditions that we have broken); Roe, 410 U.S, at 140,147 n.41 (specifically noting a "more
liberal trend" in American laws on abortion in its analysis of the history of the right to
abortion).
112 Sec Kelly, supra note 3, at 220-21; sec also Moore, 431 U.S. at 549-50 (White, J., dis-
senting) (acknowledging that the Court "estimates" what is deeply rooted in our traditions,
and that it is arguable what the deeply rooted traditions of the country are).
410 U.S. at 153,165 (also noting that after the first trimester the state's interests
become sufficiently coinpelling to enable it to regulate some aspects of abortion). Roe has
been modified by Casey, which applies an "undue burden" test in lien of strict scrutiny in
abortion cases. See Casty, 505 U.S. at 874-77.
114 Roe, 410 U.S. at 117-18.
Id. at 153.
116 Id.
117 See id. at 136-39 (noting that English statutory law made abortion of a quick fetus a
capital crime, and pointing to American state legislation that criminalized abortion in the
nineteenth century). The Court also pointed to some conflicting history regarding the
social acceptance of abortion: Greek and Roman law afforded little protection to the un-
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majority in Roe heavily relied on the fact that the common law did not
criminalize abortions prior to "quickening" to support its finding of a
fundamental right to a pre-viability abortion.'' 8 The dissent, on the
other hand, specifically pointed to the majority's selective use of his-
torical evidence, and emphasized that abortion had been criminal-
ized under eighteenth century common law, and that contemporary
society continued to debate the morality of abortion. 119
Likewise, in the 1892 decision Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the
U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed a woman's fundamental liberty inter-
est in choosing to have an abortion. 12° III Casey, abortion clinics and
physicians challenged, on due process grounds, a Pennsylvania statute
that, subject to limited exceptions, restricted abortion by requiring a
24-hour waiting period, parental consent for minor women's abor-
tions, and by requiring that a married woman notify her husband re-
garding the abortion. 121 The Court reasoned that a state may not un-
duly burden a woman's right to choose an abortion before fetal viabil-
ity. 122 The Casey Court grounded this right on the broad proposition
that at the heart of the liberty interest is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. 123 In reaching its decision, the Casey Court heavily re-
lied on stare decisis and on the country's reliance upon Roe v. Wade
over the previous thirty years. 124 This decision exemplifies the Court's
use of historical changes that imply a societal evolving conscience to
uphold certain rights as fundamenta1. 125
born, ancient religion did not bar abortion, and the common law did not ban abortion
prior to "quickening." Id. at 130,132-33. It also pointed to a contemporaneous, more
liberal trend' in laws regarding abortion to bolster its conclusion that the right to abortion
is a fundamental right. See id. at 147.
119 See id. at 136-41.
119 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 174-75 (Rehnquistd., dissenting).
129 See 505 U.S. at 846-51.
121
 Id. at 844-45.
122 Id. at 874-77. The Court's use of an "undue burden" test instead of strict scrutiny
was designed to address the peculiar fact that a woman is not alone in her pregnancy. See
id. This suggests that the majority intended to limit the application of this slightly lower
standard of scrutiny to abortion, thus retaining the strict scrutiny standard with regard to
other substantive due process fundamental rights. Sec id. But see id. at,988 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that the "undue burden" test employed by the majority establishes a
dangerous precedent that could be applied to any fundamental right in the future).
123 Sec id. at 851.
124 SCC id. at 846,867.
125 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-50.
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4. Rights That. Are Not Deeply Rooted on Their Face: Refusing to Ac-
cord Fundamental-Right Status
In contrast, the Court has sometimes refused either to frame a
right broadly or to focus on the right's conflicting history in order to
accord it fundamental status. 126
 For example, in the 1986 case of Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that. homosexual
sodomy127
 is not a fundamental interest, and therefore applied mini-
mum rationality scrutiny to a statute designed to curb such con-
duct. 128 The plaintiff in Bowers was charged with violating Georgia's
statute that criminalized sodomy between any two persons. 129
 On its
face, the Georgia statute criminalized sodomy for both same-sex and
opposite-sex couples.'" Seminal to this decision, however, was the
Court's reasoning that. same-sex sodomy was not deeply rooted in our
nation's history, and was in fact historically criminalized in various
states."' The Court reasoned that there was no connection between
homosexual activity and the fundamental liberty interests in family,
marriage, and procreation. 132
 The Court concluded that because
there was no fundamental right to homosexual sodomy, the proper
standard of review was minimal scrutiny.'"
Justice Blackmun pointed out in dissent, 134 however, that Bowers
should be properly regarded as a case about an individual's funda-
mental right of intimate association, which underlies the substantive
clue process right to privacy.'" Justice Blackmun also reasoned that
the constitutionally protected right to make decisions about sexual
relations is rendered empty if a gay man or lesbian is given no real
choice but a life without any physical intimacy. 13" Thus, Justice Black-
mun would haveframed the right in question broadly in order to use
126 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94,200-01.
127
 Note that this terminology is used because it is the verbiage used by the Bowers
Court in its opinion.
1 =8 See id. at 191-92.
122 Id. at 187-88.
00 Id.
m Id. at 194 n.5-6.
"2 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191. Commentators have distinguished Bowes front DOHA
and same-sex marriage cases on the grounds that Bowers did not involve marriage, as the
court specifically notes in the above-paraphrased reasoning. See Kelly, supra note 3, at 230-
31.
133
 See Rowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
134 Bowers has been highly criticized by scholars as wrongly decided, and even Justice
Powell, who was the deciding vote, acknowledged that he should have voted differently,
and that the dissent's position should have prevailed. Sec Kelly, supno note 3, at 232.
"3 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199-201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
156
 Id. at 203 n.2.
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the broad right's deep roots in history to extend fundamental right
status to the narrower right to homosexual sodomy. 137
C. Framer's Intent
This nation was founded, and the U.S. Constitution drafted, on
the fundamental underlying premise that individuals are free to
choose for themselves how to lead their own lives and have the right
to be let alone.' 38 The Framers of the Constitution sought to secure to
individuals conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness, which
include protecting an individual's choice in forming beliefs, thoughts,
emotions, and sensations)" As the U.S. Supreme Court held, a way of
life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests
of others is not to be condemned simply because it is different."°
The Framers' broad conceptualization of liberty in turn imbues
the Court's substantive due process analysis.t"l The Framers did not
intend for the meaning of liberty to be constrained to the specific
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 142 Alexander Hamilton was
concerned about adopting a Bill of Rights because of the danger that
it would contain exceptions to powers, which are not granted, and
that such enumerated rights could later "furnish, to men disposed to
usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming that power."• 3 Likewise,
James Madison noted that the strongest argument against the Bill of
Rights was the danger that emu-iterating particular exceptions to the
grant of power would disparage those rights that were not enumer-
ated)""
137 Sec id. at 199-200. Note that the methodology advocated by Justice Blackmun in
Bowers is the same methodology used by the Court in Griswold. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-
86.
150 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 207 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969)).
190 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 224 (1972); see also J.S. Mut., ON LIBERTY 13
(Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1859) (arguing that the government can
only legitimately interfere with an individual's liberty to 'live his own life his own way' if
the individual exercises his liberty in a way that either harms or impinges upon the liberty
of others).
"' See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Roc, 410 U.S. at 168 (Stewart,
J., concurring) (reasoning that in a Constitution for a free people, the meaning of liberty
mnst be broad); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488-90 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
192 Sec Griswold, 381 U.S. at 490 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also U.S. CONS•. amend.
IX (stating that the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people).
143 The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
1{4 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 489-90 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting James Madison, I
ANNALS or CONGRESS 439 (Gales and Seaton ed. 1834)).
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Thus, the words of the Framers lend support to the view that an
individual's liberty interest should be broadly construed, and that.
specific rights need not. be
 enumerated in the Constitutional text to
be deemed fundamental. 145
 The Framers purposefully left the con-
cept of liberty open to gather meaning from experience, because they
knew that only a stagnant society remains unchanged, 146
 More impor-
tantly, the Framers added the Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion to make it clear that the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights
should not be used to disparage a broader meaning of liberty, be-
cause the people retained other, non-enumerated rights. 147 Thus, it is
proper that the Court account for changes in our traditions and
evolving conscience when applying the "deeply rooted" test for fun-
damental rights. 148
D. Same-Sex Marriages: "Deeply Rooted"? In whose tradition?
If we narrowly define the right infringed upon by DOMA as the
right to same-sex marriages, it could be challenging to argue that
such a right is deeply rooted in our history, traditions, and collective
conscience, or that such a right is implicit in the concept. of ordered
hberty. 149 Nevertheless, this argument would turn on whose history,
traditions, and collective conscience one analyzes. ] '°
As one commentator points out, the United States boasts a num-
ber of distinct and conflicting traditions)" Several ancient cultures,
including Egypt, classical Greece, imperial China, republican and im-
perial Rome, as well as some modern cultures such as certain societies
in Africa, Asia, and Australia, have accepted same-sex marriage. 152
Furthermore, some Native North American tribes not only tradition-
ally accepted, but fidly institutionalized, gay relationships.t 53
145 See id.
146
 See Roe. 410 U.S. at 169 (Stewart, J., concurring) (tploting Frankfurter, J. in National
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949)).
147 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (stating that the enumeration in the Constitution of cer-
tain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people),
148
 Sec Moore, 431 U.S. at 501 (stating that the Court should look both to the traditions
that Americans have stuck to and to the traditions that we have broken in determining
what is implicit in our concept of ordered liberty).
149 Sec Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
I" Sec Kelly, supra note 3, at 220-21.
151 Sec id.
152 See id.
155 See Harriet Whitehead, The Bow and the Burden Strap: A New Look at Institutionalized
Homosexuality irl Native North America. in SEXUAL NI EANINCS: TILE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION
or GENDER AND SEXUALITY 80 (Sherry B. Ortner & Harriet Whitehead eds., 1981).
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Moreover, sonic American states, such as Hawaii and Vermont,
have either attempted to fully recognize same-sex marriages or have
at least established civil unions to recognize same-sex relationships. 154
More importantly, the Supreme Court of Georgia struck down the
Georgia statute in question in Bowers v. Hardwick as invalid under the
right of privacy protected by the Georgia constitution.t 55 The Georgia
Supreme Court grounded its holding on the state constitution to
avoid being bound by Bowers. 156 Furthermore, as commentators have
pointed out, there are inconsistencies within the Judeo-Christian tra-
dition's treatment of same-sex marriages. 157
On the other hand, as the Bowers majority pointed out, there are
strains of the Judeo-Christian tradition, such as the modern Roman
Catholic Church, that disapprove of individuals who engage in same-
sex sexual conduct, 158 Additionally, sodomy was a criminal offense at
common law and a statutory offense in many American states. 159 Even
so, these traditions are themselves conflicting: sodomy was criminal-
ized at common law, but as the dissent in Bowers points out, such stat-
utes criminalized sodomy for both gay and non-gay couples, and did
not criminalize same-sex sexual relationships per se.IN Thus, although
a selective reading of these common law traditions provides support
for the proposition that same-sex relationships were not historically
accepted, a thorough survey reveals a far more complex, and less de-
cisive, truth.' 6 '
Moreover, our legal history, through the Court's own opinions in
cases such as Griswold, Zablocki and Bowels, has affirmed states' rights
to "say who may marry" and to forbid sexual practices associated with
lesbians and gay men. 162 One can argue, however, that our society's
154
	 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (1999); Baehr; 852 P.2d at 67 (holding that law de-
nying same-sex couples the right to marry should be subject to strict scrutiny). Although
the Hawaii Supreme Court attempted to recognize same-sex marriages, the Hawaii legisla-
ture overturned Baehr in 1998 by amending the state's constitution to enable the legisla-
ture to reserve marriage exclusively to opposite-sex couples. See Hi CONST. Art. 1, § 23
(1998); see also Vicki L. Armstrong, Welcome to the 21st Century and the Legalization of Same-Sex
Unions, 18 T.M. COOLEY L.. Rix. 85, 94-95 (2001).
155 See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 21, 24 (Ga. 1998) (holding that unforced sexual
behavior conducted in private between consenting adults is protected by the right to pri-
vacy under Georgia's constitution).
156 See Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 22.
157 Sec Kelly, supra note 3, at 220-21.
158 Sec Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94.
158
 See id. at 193-94.
160 See id. at 216 u.8 (Stevens, J.. dissenting).
161 See
162 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 396-98 (Powell, j„ concurring in the
judgment); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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evolving conscience has become more receptive to same-sex mar-
riages since these decisions.m Some states have shown an increasing
openness toward institutionalizing committed same-sex relation-
ships,ts" In addition, major U.S. corporations and several municipali-
ties have begun to recognize same-sex relationships as they do oppo-
site-sex relationships for employee benefit. purposes. 165 These legal
and societal developments demonstrate that times are changing, and
that our conscience is evolving with regard to same-sex relation-
ships. 166
Secondly, there is strong support for a right to self-definitional
autonomy, which encompasses the right to same-sex marriages.m
This broader right could encompass same-sex marriages because
same-sex marriages, like the marriages in Loving and Zablocki, involve
the freedom to marry the person of one's choosing. 168 Furthermore,
the right to self-definitional autonomy encompasses same-sex mar-
riages because these marriages, like the marriage in Tirrnei; involve
elements such as emotional support, public commitment, spiritual
significance and personal dedication,t 69 As Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall warned in Moore, we must not interpret the Constitution to im-
pose a majority's cultural myopic views regarding proper family forms
on the entire population.ro This is particularly true in light of the fact
that the Constitution's very structure was deliberately crafted to pro-
tect against a tyranny of the majority.rn Thus, same-sex marriages in-
165 See Armstrong, supra note 154, at 85-90; see also supra notes 154-156 and accompa-
Hying text.
le" See Armstrong, supra note 154, at 89-90 (pointing to the Vermont Civil Union Act,
and to Alaska, Hawaii, and Vermont decisions against limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples).
165
 See id. at 107-09.
166 Sec id. at 108; sec also Moore, 431 U.S. at 501 (noting that the Court looks both to the
traditions that Americans have stuck to and to the traditions that we have broken in de-
termining what is implicit in our concept of ordered liberty).
' 67 Sec Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (131ackmund., dissenting).
168 See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383-84; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; see also Giszoold, 381 U.S. at
486 (marriage is protected because it is au association that promotes a way of life, a har-
mony in living, and a bilateral loyalty).
169 See Turner; 482 U.S. at 95-96; Toussaint, supra note 12, at 933-34 (noting that many
different family forms, including same-sex relationships, can perform family functions and
embody marital attributes).
171 See Abort 431 U.S. at 507-08 (Brennan,]., concurring).
I71 Sec TIIE FEDERALIST Nos. 10,51 ()antes Madison) (reasoning that the Constitution
creates a will in the community independent of, and as a check upon, the majority, lest the
rights of individuals or the minority be imperiled by the majority); Tit E non:Rims -1- No. 68
(Alexander Hamilton) (noting that it is the role of the judiciary to constrain majoritarian
inclinations that are inconsistent with the Constitution).
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wive choices that are critical to an individual's self-definitional
autonomy. 172
The history and traditions upon which this country was built, as
well as the Court's own jurisprudence, provide support for the propo-
sition that an individual has a fundamental right to make choices that
are critical to self-definition, and to live "his own life his own way." 173
This is particularly true in the areas of family life, intimate associa-
tions, and marriage."4
As illustrated by the Court in Turtle); even a criminal whose lib-
erty interests are legitimately curtailed by the state's penological in-
terest retains a fundamentally protected residual interest in marriage,
which is a choice that is critical to self-definition. 175 Furthermore, the
Bowers Court itself stated that a major reason that the homosexual
sodomy at bar did not involve a fundamental right was because it was
not associated with family life and marriage. 176 This language front
Bowers leaves open the possibility that even the Bowers majority might.
have come out differently if the conduct at issue had been associated
with marriage rights." 7
II. MALLEABLE USE OF H ISTORY AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-
DEFINITIONAL AUTONOMY: A CASE FOR STRIKING
DOWN DOMA UNDER SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Substantive due process has been used extensively to protect the
fundamental right to privacy, including the fundamental right to
marriage. 178 The Defense of Marriage Act is a particularly intriguing
statute to analyze under the Due Process Clause, because it is a prism
through which the U.S. Supreme Court's substantive due process ju-
risprudence can be scrutinized and arguably undermined. 179 Namely,
DOMA's constitutionality under substantive clue process turns solely
on the Court's willingness to accord fundamental-right status to the
controversial right to same-sex marriage. 180 The Court's choice in this
matter is not constrained by its prior substantive due process jurisprit-
172 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Moore, 431 U.S. at 502.
172 Sec Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Mitt.,
supra note 140, at 13.
174 See Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 n.11; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
176 Sec Turner; 482 U.S. at 95-96.
176 SCC &WM, 478 U.S. at 191.
See id.
178 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 486 (1965).
179 See infra notes 246-250 and accompanying text.
leo See infra notes 246-261 and accompanying text.
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dence. 181 In fact, if the Court does not accord same-sex marriages
fundamental-right status, it would undermine its own precedents by
calling the continued viability of these precedents' methodologies
into question. 182
While the Court has typically been steadfast in protecting the
fundamental right to marriage, it has been less resolute in protecting
other aspects of intimate choices, such as abortion, as fundamental
rights. 183 Yet, cases such as Planned Parenthood v. Casey provide some of
the strongest. language in support of a broad conceptualization of the
fundamental right to privacy in intimate choices, which is deemed
essential to the concept of' ordered liberty. 184
 Furthermore, the Court.
has in the past accorded fundamental right status to things that are
not deeply rooted in our history and traditions, such as interracial
marriages. 135
 Although the Court does not admit it, it is flexible in
applying its "deeply rooted" test when certain liberties that are essen-
tial to one's intimate associations are at bar. 186
As demonstrated in Part. LD, same-sex marriage can be construed
as "deeply rooted" in our history and traditions. 187
 This is because the
right to same-sex marriage is encompassed in the broader right to
self-definitional autonomy, which is in turn deeply rooted in our his-
tory and traditions. 188
Part ILA explores the Court's use of deeply rooted, broadly
defined rights to extend fundamental right status to their narrower,
not deeply rooted variants) 89
 The right infringed upon by DOMA
should be construed broadly, either as the right to enter into a mar-
riage with a person of one's choosing, or as the right to self-
definitional autonomy. 19° This construction of the right in question is
consistent with the Court's precedents in this area of law, and would
181 See infra notes 246-261 and accompanying text.
182 See infra notes 259-261 and accompanying text.
183
 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874-77 (1992) (weakening
significantly the fundamental right status accorded to abortion tinder Roe v. Wade by lower-
ing its standard of review from strict scrutiny to an "undue burden" test).
184 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
188 See Laving, 388 U.S. at 12.
186
 Sec Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-50; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158-66 (1973); Loving, 388
U.S. at 12; Gtiswold, 381 U.S. at 483-86.
187 See supra notes 149-177 and accompanying text.
ma See supra notes 164-173 and accompanying text.
189
 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
' 90 Sec Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Loving,
388 U.S. at 12.
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extend fundamental right status to the narrower, variant right to en-
ter into a same-sex marriage. 191
Alternatively, Part II.11 argues that even if DOMA burdens only a
narrowly construed right to same-sex marriage, the Court's substan-
tive due process precedents still support a finding that DOMA in-
fringes on a fundamental right. 192 Precedents demonstrate that the
Court has accorded fundamental right status to rights that were not.
deeply rooted in our history and traditions. 193 These rights, like the
right to enter into a same-sex marriage, were arguably becoming
more accepted by our societal evolving conscience, and were thereby
accorded protection as fundamental rights. 194 Furthermore, the
"deeply rooted" test for fundamental rights has been used as a guide
rather than as an exclusionary bright-line rule in the Court's substan-
tive due process jurisprudence. 195
A. Broadly Construed Rights
In a Constitution for a fire people, there can be no doubt that the meaning
of liberty must be broad indeed.
—Justice Stewart.' 96
As construed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the fundamental right
to marriage is sufficiently broad to encompass same-sex marriage. 197
In the area of privacy rights, the Court has consistently reasoned that
there is an underlying right of individual autonomy of choice in areas
that are essential to one's self-definition. 198
In.this view, the Court is not merely protecting scattered, unre-
lated rights that it sees as fundamental to the concept of ordered lib-
erty.' 99 It is instead protecting complementary rights that collectively
form the deeper, underlying right that the Court is truly striving to
protect: the right to an individual's self-definitional autonomy. 209 This
1 °' Sec Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
192 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-50; Roe, 410 U.S. at 158-66.
195 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-50; Roe, 410 U.S. at 158-66.
194 Sec Casey, 505 U.S. at 850; Roe, 410 U.S. at 158-59, 163, 165.
395 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
196 Roe, 410 U.S. at 168 (Stewart, J., concurring).
197 See Kelly, SU pro note 3, at 219-20; Toussaint, supra note 12, at 952.
199 Sec Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; BOWCIS, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackm u n, J., dissenting).
199 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 169 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that liberty is not a series
of isolated points priced out in terms of specific, textually enumerated rights, but that it is
instead a rational continuum that includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary imposi-
tions and purposeless restraints).
200 Sec Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (recognizing individuals' right to form their own concept
of existence); Roe, 410 U.S. at 169.
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broad, underlying right encompasses individuals' right. to choose
their marriage partners.m This conceptualization of the underlying
fundamental right finds support in both the Court's precedents and
in the intent of the Framers. 202
1. Broad Language
The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions involving rights that are en-
compassed under the fundamental right. to privacy can be interpreted
as protecting the individual's underlying right to autonomy in self-
clefinition. 203 The Griswold v. Connecticut Court. emphasized the fact
that marriage is an association of people that promotes a way of life, a
harmony in living, and a bilateral loyalty. 204
Likewise, the Casey Court reasoned that a woman's constitution-
ally protected right to a pre-viability abortion is grounded on the fact
that at the heart of the liberty interest is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. 205 The Court. in Moore v. City of East Cleveland noted that.
rights are protected as fundamental because they bear on an individ-
ual's freedom of choice in matters relating to individual fulfillment. 206
This broad language supports the proposition that an individual's
self-definitional autonomy should be protected as fundamental and
should encompass a wide range of subsidiary rights that. are essential
to that right.. 207
In Bowers v. Hardwick, a case which many people, including jus-
tice Powell—who was the deciding vote—have admitted was wrongly
decided, 208 the dissent pointed to precedents' broad conceptualiza-
tions of liberty in asserting that homosexuals have a fundamental sub-
standve due process right to their intimate associations.m Justice
Blackmun, writing for the four-person dissent, noted that the Court
2°1 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
202 Sec Bowers, 478 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
2°9 Sec Casg, 505 U.S. at 851; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J.. dissenting).
2° 1 See 381 U.S. at 486.
208 Sec 505 U.S. at 851.
206 See 431 U.S. at 50411.11.
207 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; B011103, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Moore,
431 U.S. at 504 u.11; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483 (noting that the Court must extend constitu-
tional protection to peripheral rights to properly secure the specific rights).
208
 See Kelly, soul note 3, at 232.
2"9 See 478 U.S. at 201,204-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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should have analyzed Hardwick's claim in light of the values that un-
derlie the constitutional right to privacy.210
Justice Blackmun asserted in Bowers that the right to privacy in-
cludes individuals' choices about the most intimate aspects of their
lives, such as their intimate associations and sexual relations. 2" He
then noted that substantive due process protects certain rights associ-
ated with the family because these rights form a central part of an in-
dividual's life. 2 t 2 He reasoned that rights protected by substantive clue
process touch upon individuals' self-definition and ability to inde-
pendently define their identity, which in turn are central to any con-
cept of liberty. 218 The Bowers dissent concluded that individuals define
themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual relation-
ships, and that individuals have the right to choose for themselves the
form and nature of these personal bonds. 214
Thus, the Bowers dissenters explicitly endorsed the thesis that the
Court is striving to protect an individual's underlying right to self-
definitional autonomy by recognizing certain specific rights as fun
damental liberties under substantive due process. 2 n In this view,
rights such as marriage are protected because they are crucial con-
stituent rights that, taken together, contribute to an individual's over-
all ability to live her or his own life, her or his own way. 2"
2. Framers' Intent
The Framers purposefully structured the Constitution in terms of
broad concepts because they knew that a document that would en-
dure through generations had to adapt its meaning to changing con-
ditions. 217 As Justice Frankfurter asserted, great concepts like liberty
were purposefully left to gather meaning from experience in order to
accommodate changing views. 218
The Court also pointed out that the Framers sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, thoughts, emotions and sensations—all of
which are intrinsically tied to an individual's self-definitional auton-
210 Id. at 199 (emphasis added). The dissent included Justices Blackmun, Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens. Id. at 199.
211 Id. at 199-201, 203 n.2.
212 See id. at 204.
213 Id. at 205.
214 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blacknum, J., dissenting).
215 Sec id.
216 Sec id. at 206; see also MILL, supra note 140, at 13.
217 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 169 (Stewart, J., concurring).
218 Id. (quoting Frankfurter, J., dissenting, in National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646).
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omy. 219
 This includes one's right to choose the form and nature of
one's in lima te associations. 220
Furthermore, the specific constituent rights that comprise an in-
dividual's fundamental right to self-definitional autonomy need not be
textually entimerated. 221
 As Justice Goldberg pointed out in his con-
currence in Griswold, the Framers did not. intend that the first eight.
Amendments be construed to exhaust. the fundamental rights that the
Constitution guarantees to the people. 222
 In fact, such a judicial con-
struction would violate the Ninth Amendment's explicit. mandate that
the enumerated rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people. 223
3. Using the Broader Right's Historical Roots to Protect the Narrower
Right as Fundamental
The Supreme Court has upheld some variants of previously ac-
knowledged fundamental rights that were not themselves rooted in
tradition at all. 224
 For instance, the Loving v. Virginia Court upheld the
substantive chte process right of every individual to marry the person
of their choice despite the fact that interracial marriages were not
deeply rooted in history and tradition, and were in fact highly con-
demned by most of American society. 225 In Bowers, Justice Blackmun
referred to the parallel between Loving and homosexual intimate as-
sociation on this very ground. 22° Namely, opponents of both interracial
marriages and homosexual intimate association point to traditional
Judeo-Christian values and states' criminal statutes concerning the
conduct at issue—but this reasoning was rejected in Loving, partially
because marriage was involved. 227
 The Loving Court's finding of a
fundamental right despite the lack of a deeply rooted right to this
particular variant of marriage stems from the Court's hitherto tuiwav-
219
 See Bowen.. 478 U.S. at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
220 Sec id. at 206.
221 Sec Griswold, 381 U.S. at 490 (Goldberg, J„ concurring).
222 Id.
229
 U.S. CoNs'r, amend. IX (stating that the enumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people); Griswold,
381 U.S. at 491.
224 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; Griswold, 381 U.S at 486.
229 See 388 U.S. at 6, 12.
226 See BOWCIS. 478 U.S. at 211 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
227 See id.
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ering protection of the right to marriage. 228 This is true even where a
person's liberty interest is compromised. 229
As illustrated by the Court in Turner v. Salley, even a criminal
whose liberty interests, including the interest in sexual intimacy, are
legitimately curtailed by the state retains a fundamentally protected
residual interest in marriage. 250 Turner demonstrates that the Bowers
Court's holding that homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental right
does not preclude a later finding that same-sex marriages are funda-
mentally protected under substantive clue process. 23 ► Namely, while
the states may have the right to curb sodomy, same-sex marriages—
like the marriage of the inmates in Turnerhave important attributes
besides sexual conduct that are sufficient to form a constitutionally
protected marital relationship. 232 If the Court is logically consistent,
restrictions upon a same-sex couple's right to enter into a marriage,
like the restrictions in Turner; should not even survive minimal scru-
tiny despite arguably legitimate restrictions on their sexual concluct. 233
This, of course, would be the constitutional minimum, since same-sex
couples, unlike the inmates in Turner; are not criminals whose liberty
interests can legitimately be curtailed by the states' penological inter-
est. 234 Thus, restrictions upon a same-sex couple's right to enter into a
marriage should be subject to strict scrutiny review. 235
Likewise, by framing the right in question as the right to privacy
in marriage, the Griswold Court protected married couples' right to
use contraceptives despite the fact that contraceptive use was not
deeply rooted in our history and traditions. 230 This broader concep-
tualization of the right at bar enabled the Court to find its deep roots
in our tradition, because the right of privacy in marriage is a right
older than the Bill of Rights.237
228 Sce Turner v. Salley, 482 U.S. 78,95-96 (1987); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; Griswold, 381
U.S. at 486.
229 See Turner; 482 U.S. at 95-96.
239 See id.
231 See id. (holding that even when an individual's sexual conduct is lawfully regulated,
the individual still retains the right to marriage).
252 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191; Turner. 482 U.S. at 95-96.
235 Sec 482 U.S. at 97.
254 Sec id. at 95-96.
235 See id. at 81,89 (noting that a lesser standard than strict scrutiny applies because of
inmates' restricted liberty interests in the prison context).
236 See 381 U.S. at 486,505.
237 See id.
2002]	 DOMA, Due Process Ce Deeply Rooted Beliefs	 203
B. Evolving Conscience: A Right Need Not Be Deeply
Rooted to Be Fundamental
The Constitution is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and
the accident of our finding certain opinions .natural and familial; or novel,
and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question
whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United
Slates.
—Justice Holmes238
The U.S. Supreme Court's substantive due process jurisprudence
demonstrates that the "deeply rooted" test is often flexibly imple-
mented depending on the specific rights at. stake. 239 The Court often
finds a right's deep roots by focusing on selective parts of an inconsis-
tent historical record, or by drawing upon our societal evolving con-
science.240
Roc v. Wade is very telling of the Court's willingness to accord
fundamental status to rights that, when narrowed to the specific ac-
tion at issue, are not deeply rooted in our . traditions. 241 Unlike Gris-
wold, Roe did not even involve a marital relationship upon whose deep
roots the Court could ground its finding of a constitutionally pro-
tected right to an abortion. 242 As pointed out by Justice Rehnquist in
dissent, the majority in Roe glossed over historical evidence that abor-
tion had been criminalized under eighteenth century common law. 243
The majority dismissed this evidence by reasoning that it is doubtful
that abortion was ever firmly established as a common-law crime. 244
Thus, the majority held that abortion is a fundamental right despite
the historical evidence that arguably opposed, and at best tenuously
supported, the deep roots of the right to an abortion. 245
Furthermore, Casey is one of the latest. examples of the Court's
willingness to find a fundamental liberty interest in rights that are not
deeply rooted in tradition. 246
 The Court reasoned that a state may not
unduly burden a woman's right to choose an abortion before fetal
238
 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
239 Sec Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-50; Roe, 410 U.S. at 158-66; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; Gt.'s-
wo/d, 381 U.S. at 483-86.
249 See Cosev,.505 U.S. at 846-50; Roc, 410 U.S. at 158-66,
241 Sec 410 U.S. at 136-39,153 (noting conflicts within common law tradition regard.
ing abortion).
242 Scc id. at 113 (noting that Jane Roe was a single pregnant woman).
243 See id. at 174-75 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
244 See id. at 136.
245 See id. at 153,174-75,
248 See 505 U.S. at 846-50.
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viability. 247 Tile Casey Court ducked the concerns about abortion not
being deeply rooted in our history and tradition by grounding its de-
cision on stare decisis and on the reliance of society upon Roe during
the previous thirty years. 248 This basis for the Casey decision suggests
that the Court was looking to our society's evolving conscience in up-
holding the fundamental right to an abortion. 249 In fact, the Casey
Court implicitly admitted that the "deeply rooted" test is not the best
proxy for defining fundamental rights tinder substantive due proc-
ess. 25°
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court, although emphasizing tradition and
history as the roots from which fundamental rights stem, has been
quite willing to overlook, or to selectively read, such history and tradi-
tions. 251 It has done so when the plurality feels it is proper to uphold
as fundamental some variant forms of fundamental rights that have
been undermined by, and actively infringed upon, history and tradi-
tion. 252 This methodology is consistent with the view that the judiciary
should protect un-enumerated rights that are retained by the people
and are essential components of broader fundamental rights. 253
As illustrated in this Note, the Court's substantive due process
jurisprudence can accommodate same-sex marriage as a fundamental
right, and thereby subject the Defense of Marriage Act to strict scru-
247 See id. at 874-77.
249 Sec id. at 846.
249 See id. at 846-50.
259 See id. at 850 (reasoning that the adjudication of substantive due process claims may
require the Court to exercise its reasoned judgment in determining the boundaries be-
tween the individual's liberty and the demands of organized society).
251 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130-40, 153 (1973) (finding that the fundamental
right to privacy includes the right to choose to have an abortion, despite deeply en-
trenched societal and religious convictions against it); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6, 12
(1967) (holding that the fundamental right to marriage includes interracial marriages
despite longstanding history of a societal animus toward racial miscegenation); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S 479, 486, 505 (1965) (finding that the fundamental right to privacy
includes the right for married couples to use contraceptives despite history of moral dis-
approval of contraceptives). In doing so, it is true that the Court sometimes utilizes equal
protection to extend an already recognized due process fundamental right to classes that
were not traditionally included in it. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 2. The Court has also, however,
utilized a "pure" substantive due process analysis to broadly interpret fundamental rights
in order to include rights to which history and tradition were quite hostile. See Loving. 388
U.S. at 12; Griswold, 381 U.S at 486.
252 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 130-40, 153; Loving, 388 U.S. at 6, 12; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486,
505.
259 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX; supra notes 79-107, 217-223 and accompanying text.
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tiny. 254
 This is because of the two primary methodologies the Court.
used in applying the "deeply rooted" test to its precedents. 255 Namely,
the Court's methodology in the first class of cases was to frame the
right in question as a broad right that encompasses the narrow right
at bar. 256
 It then uses the deep historical roots of the broader right to
support the extension of fundamental status to its narrower variant. 257
In the second class of cases, the Court upholds certain rights as fun-
damental by either selectively focusing on favorable parts of a
conflicting historical record, or by emphasizing historical changes
that imply a societal evolving conscience. 258
If the Court fails to subject DOMA to strict scrutiny for infringing
upon either the fundamental right to marry or the fundamental right
to self-definitional autonomy, it could undermine its own precedents.
Namely, if the Court declines to use the methodologies employed in
cases such as Loving, Griswold, Casty and Roe, to protect same-sex mar-
riages as fundamental rights, it could call into question the continued
viability of its own methodologies. 259
 The Court might also expose
itself to criticism for selectively employing such methodologies at its
own judicial whim. 26o This could in turn weaken these precedents
themselves, for it would erode the viability of the methodologies by
which the Court. arrived at these holdings. The emasculation of these
precedents would in turn undermine the protections currently af-
forded to our most cherished liberties, which enable us to choose
how to conduct. our intimate lives our own way.261
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